DOJ\u27s Use of the False Claims Act: A Critique by Luce, Gregory
Practical Issues ill Health Law 
Ccunpbcll Lavv Rcvic\v Symposiunl 2009 
DO]'s Use of the False Clainls Act: i\. Critique 
Gregon'M. Lill'I:' 
Friday, January 30, 2009 
Sheraton Raleigh Hotel 
-121 South Salisbury Street 
Raleigh, NC 27GOl 
C;regory ;\f. Lure, Esq. 
Skaclclen Arps Slate ~lcagher & Flom LLP 
1-1--1-0 l\:ev,,' Y()rk~\'(,llUe, N.W. 
\\ asl1ingtol1, D.C. 2()()O:J 2111 
202-:)71-,:{]() 
gI.:.t)gQILILl~:..t~_'ISh_tld~I\:,D-,coJU 
THE FALSE CLADIS Acr: REl~I~G L'i EXP:\;'iSIVE THEORIES OF LIABILITY 
by Greg Lure 
T\lpj.f: Recent cumt decisioIlS demonstrate theiudiciary's increasll1g lll1\\ illingllc"s tu accept 
nm el and e.\pansive thenries Ill' illegality as predicates to imposing False Claims ,\ct ("FCA") 
li'lhility: hO\\t.'Yer. e\'en as some of the more c.\pansiw theories l11' liability are summarily 
dispcnsed. cOllgressiulInl kadel's seck to open a tloudgatc of (Jlli 10111 suits through the 
intrnduct ion \) f the Faist' Claims Correctiun Act. 
• Narrowing the Field of Relators: The Supreme Court's Ban on "Claim Smuggling" 
The FCA eliminates fed end jurisdiction uwr ~1l1 action predicated (111 publicly disclosed 
information "unless the action is brought hy the Attorney General or the person bringing 
the action is a original source of the information." J 1 l) .S.c. ~ J 7J()( e)( 4 )lA) (emphasis 
added). Qui {UIII rclators seeking to c.\pand the universe of claims cligi ble for federal 
cuurt review often bUDdle allegations in a multi-claim complaint: hO'vvever. in light of 
recent action by the Supreme Court relators must prepare for vigorous e.\arnination of the 
jurisdictional basis for each claim. 
o In Rockll!.'!l !1l1l..'/'Iloliol7ol Cotp. 1'. «l7ired S'{oft's, 549 U.S. 457 (2007), the 
Supreme Court examined whether the qui /0111 relator vvas an original source of 
the rCA claims asserted. The Court found ~ 3 nO( e)( -1-) requires relators to 
establish 'uriginal source' status for each and every claim based. in Vyhllk or in 
part. on a public disclosure and that relators cannot bootstrap jurisdictioll for one 
claim by establishing original source status for another. or as characterized by 
Justice Scalia "claim smuggle". Essentially. a relator's decision to join all claims 
in a single cllmplaint will not rescue claims jurisdictionally barred under section 
(e)( 4). 
• Line of Sight LiabiIity:Falsity without Intent "To Get" Government Funds 
Individuals and en! ities that receive government funds in exchange for goods or services 
orten employ a nel\\ork of subcontractors and consultants as part or their normal business 
practices. Historically. 1~11se statements by third-parties could predicate a rCA action. 
provided the 1~11se statement was materially relied upon by a primary C(lTltractllr ill 
obtainillg gmernnlt'IH funds, amI despite the filet that the third-party migbt be unav\are of 
the government's involvement. Ho\,vever. in a recent landmark decision the Supreme 
Court clarified the circumstances under \\hich ~'l subcontractor's t~llse statements may give 
rise to potential 1('/\ liability. 
o In ,1!!i.\(}J/ EII,'t!,illt' \'. {'"ired ,\/(lle\. I~!{ S.C!. 1123 (1()()!{). the ('uurt held that. 
('\'en though FCi-\ sections (n)(1) and (ilH3) do not L1cially require "pre"entment" 
uf :1 ftlsc cbiIll tu the guverlllnent. it is iIlSUt'ficil'llt to l11t..'rcly Sllll\\ Iklt a 
gO\ el'11111l'nt prime contractor used "gmernment muney" to pay till' third-pmt:-
subcol1trat..'tor. Inslead. plaintilTs Inust sh()\\ the suhcontrnclor's t~t1se 'itatemellt 
was made in order "to gd" a l~llse claim "paid or approved by the (iowrnment." 
o .-'Lllisoll FlIgillL' raises signiticant questions surrounding ITA liability for health 
care pnniders rt'imbursed under state administered health programs, such as the 
Sole Community Pro\ ider program ("SCP"). t 'nder the SCPo health care 
providers servicing rural and isolated communities receive supplemental 
paYl1lents from state administrators. TIl(' fedcral govcrnment helps shoulder costs 
associated \\ ith SCP programs by prO\iding a portion of a state's SCP funding. 
Arguably, in the \\ake of .1l/i.\o11 Ellgillt', claims j~)r SCP payments that would 
otilerv,ise gi\(~ rise to rCA liability \voule! only do so if the claim was submitted 
with the intent "to get" federal funds. an evidentiary burden not easily overcome. 
o [n Ul7ifL'd STalCS r . . \felll/ct'!', 345 F. Supp 2d lJ02 (1'.'.0. AI. 200·t). the qlli /(/11/ 
relator alleged that defendants failed to provide adequate patient care as required 
bv federal lmv and that the submission of claims to the state Medicaid 
administrator amounted to a violation of the FCA. The court detennined that the 
only directly defrauded entity was a grantee of federal funds. the Alabama 
Medicaid Agency. and that absent an allegation or suggestion of direct 
presentation of a false claim to a federal oft-icer the complaint failed tu establish 
subj ect matter jurisdiction. 
• Pleading with Particularity: The Who, \Vhat, \Vhen, Where and Huw of an Alleged 
Fraud: Q1Ii tam relators are otten disgruntled former employees with limited knowledge 
of health care's intricate reimbursement mechanisms. As a result. relators frequently file 
q/li ({1m complaints lacking the specificity required to inform defendants of the t~lcts 
sUlTounding an alleged FCA violation. instead making bare asscrtions of global 
fraudulent schemes allegedly assignable tu all involved parties, no matter how attenuated 
their relationship to the falsity may be. Increasingly. courts are inclined to summarily 
dismiss these sweeping and inadequate complaints. 
o In [i/lired Stutes ex rei. hU(fcs 1'. Dr. HUlis/w/lg Se!'udge. No. OO-CIV-317-W 
(W.O.Ok. January 30. 20(8). relators alleged that numerous defendants 
individually and collectively engaged in a consistent pattern and practice of 
wi II fully subm i ttingj~llse and fraud ulcnt claims for federal rei m bursement. On 
ddendants' motion to dismiss. the court analyzed \\hether the complaint stated 
\\ith particularity the circumstances constituting the fraud. plainly setting [()rth the 
time. place and content of the 1:1lse representation. the identity of the party 
ll1aking the false statements and the consequences cmanating therch·om. The 
court cuncluded that "lumping" or grouping together business ddendants (as both 
the relators and government had clone) withollt regard to their corporate fnrm. as 
\\e11 as generalized accusations of wrongdoing directed at defendants \v[thuut 
distinguishing among and between them. \vuuld Ilut suffice. The cuurt fuund that 
a cumpbint Lliling to l'eLlsnnably inform each defendant of the fraudulent 
acti\ities in \vhich it allegedly engaged can not stanc!. Consequently. the court 
granted defendant's Rule l)(b) motion to dismiss: ultimately. ho\vever. the COLlrt 
~dlowcd 1110dificntiun of the complaint ill ordcr to permit identitication of 
indi\iduals allegt'd to hel\e engaged in spt'ci{ic \\Tungful acts. 
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• Continuing Viability of ExpansiH' Predicate Theories of FeA Liahility: Despite 
n:'l~ellt Supreme Ctllirt action .. qui Tmll reLttors and the governmt'nt cLlntinut' to proht' the 
fringes urthe rCA. e.\:ploring the judiciar)'s inclination to entertain novel and irmo\ati,e 
ti1eclI'il's of li'lbility. 
Tht' Anti-Kickba_ck Statut,? and_the ITA: Tht' kdt'ral Anti-kickbclck statute:' (-+2 
1:.s.C. ~ 13'-:0a-7b{b)) makes it a felon) to knu\\ingly and willfully sulicit or receive 
remuneration "in return for purchasing. leasing. ordering. or arranging fur or 
rCl't)l1111lcnding purchasing. leasing ur ordering any goud. facility. service ur item f(.1r 
\\hich payment may be made in "hole or in part under a Federal he,llthcare 
program. 
o In L 'lli/ed S'/oTes ex I'd RusT 1'. Pji.-:er [IlC .. 'Jo. 03-IIOS-+-PBS (D. Mass .. Hostol1 
Sept. 18.20(8). plaintitTs alkged Ptizer unlawfully engaged in nwrketing tclcties 
(like the pro\ ision of financial incenti\·es. direct payments. and tra\·el 
boondoggles: othenvise known as 'kickbacks') to promote the off-label use of 
Genotropin. thereby causing physicians to submit thousands of falsl' claims for 
federal reimbursement. In denying defendant's motion to dismiss. the court 
ackno\\'ledged plaintiffs tailed to identi(v with particularity the payment of any 
improper kickback. but instead determined th~1t this evidentiary shortcoming was 
not ease-dispositivc and permitted discovery on the issue. 
Outlier Payments- ;\ recent trend in FCA prosecutions gaining traction in federal 
courts arises under the ()utlier Payment provision of CMS's Prospective Payment 
Systcm ("PPS"). Medicarl"s PPS docs not reimburse hospitals hlr actual costs 
ineulTed. but rather pays ~l precktermined amount tt)r each inpatient discharge based 
on the average cost of a patient's diagnosis. adj Llsted fCll" various hospital specille 
fllctors sllch as geography. Outlier Payments are designed to compensate hospitals 
for patients whose inpatient stays arc more costly than those of other patients with 
similar diagnoses. and that exceed a certain tixed threshold set by CMS. While no 
eMS regulation. nor any other federal law. appears to limit hospital charges. recent 
litigation indicates that. in practice. eMS believes hospitals must abide by an 
amorphous reasonableness standard and follow prl'vailing market charge lev-cIs. 
Vio lation of t hi s standard has been pejowti vely termed "turbo-charging." \Vhere the 
government believes a hospital raised charges j()r the purpose of increasing its 
()utlier Payments, or "turbo-chaq;ec1". it may attempt to hold the tl1Cility liable uncler 
the /-CA. 
o In B(xu RUIOIl ('011/111. [[mp .. [11(,. l'. Te!lel I [eu/I/]curt! COl'p .. 502 F. Supp. '-:d 
1237 (S.D. Fla. 20(7). plaintiffs alleged that by manipulating charges in meier to 
increase its outlier p~lyl11l'lltS. defcndant caused CMS to reduce the uutlier 
payments ,lv<lilable to non-turhocharging hospitals. Pltim,ltel) ~~r~lt1ting 
del'endunt's 1110tion for summary judgment due to plail1tifCs lack or standill~. the 
, 
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court clearly expressed its distaste for such a practice. stating in dicta "The 
I..'yidl..'nce in t hi s I..'<1SI..' pai nts a dear picturl..' II f UIlI11 i tigated corporate greed rand 1 
shameless appetite itH' protlt at the expense uf a taxpayer supported medical 
S\slt'lll." /d,lt 1:239. 
o Similarly. in lUl/gllloll1 (llilcd Hmp. 1'. St. Rumoh(/.\ CO/'l) .. ~o. 07-c\'-3236 (3d 
Cir. Jan. 5. 20(9). f(111o\\ ing defendant's st'ttlement \\ ith the DO.r llf "turho-
charging" allt~gations. plaintirf asked the court to e.\.amine \\hether defendant's 
"turbo-charging" \\as the proximate cause of its decrease in :-'/ledicare 
reimbursemcnts. Plaintiff theori7ecl thl..' "turbo-charging" scheme both increased 
the cnst threshold necessary to qualify tt)r Outlier Payments. and decreased the 
amount of any Outlier Payment actually remitted. The court found that. at hest. 
pbinti1f sutfered harms indirectly related to defendant's alleged "turho-charging" 
and that any impact on plaintiff hinged entin:ly upon eMS's administration of the 
Ivkdicare reimbursement system. 
The Physician Self-Referral ("Stark") Law and the FCA: The federal Physician Sel1'-
Referral Law (42 U.S.C. ~ 1395nn), commonly known as the Stark law, prohibits it 
physician from referring a MeJicare patient for designated health services to any 
entity with which the physician or a member of his or her immediate family has a 
tinancial relationship. 
o In ['nired Slates 1'. C(f/'lisle, No. 07-4616 (3J Cir. Jan. 2 L 2009) the court 
examined. illler alio. whether an exclusive service arrangement triggered the 
restrictions placed by the Stark law on the submission of claims for services 
rendered. Plaintiffs assertcd that clcfcndant's L11sc certification of compliance 
'vvith CMS's laws and regulatio1ls. including its certification of compliance \vith 
the Stark law. predicated multiple FCA violations. Reversing the lower court's 
dismissal of the action, the Third Circuit found defendant had in t~lct violated the 
Stark law and remandcd the mattcr for a determination of whcthcr defendant's 
actions arose to the 'knowing' submission of tillse claims t(Jr payment. 
CHf-Label Phannaceutical Marketing - Part of the FDA's mission is to ensure that 
pharmaceuticals brought to market arc safe and effective. \Vhile the FDA cloes not 
itself conduct clinical research, the New Drug Application ("NDA") and 
Investigational New Drug Application ("IND") processes are designed to ensure that 
n drug's indicated uses (that is, the uses approved by the fDA) are fit for medical 
utilization. Not infrequently, the active component in an F]),,:,\ approved drug results 
in unintt'ndcd ur unforeseen medical effects. Where a physician prescribes a drug for 
a non-indicated use. in order to take advantage or a drug's unintended yet potentially 
beneticial effects. it is referred to as off-label prescribing. FDA regulations prohibit 
pharmaceutical ellI11IXll1i\'~s from activcly marketing a drug'S off-label effects. and 
instead t'l1couragt' drug companies to seek apPl\)val for llt'W lIses unckr its [NO 
re\iew process. Drug companies that intentionally disregard the FDA's ban un ofT .. 
label marketing risk FCA liability by "causing" a provider'S presentment of claims to 
eMS for the payment of pharmaceuticals prescribed for off-label uses. 
'J III ('"ifed S'(OI!!,1 \', 'll'('//!i,1 Jlil(/I'1I1S" /11('., :'i 1.2 F, SUP]), 2d II:'iS ('\,f), III. 2()07). 
pLlil1tifts alkgt.'d that defendant \iulateo the FCA h> prullhlting ~ll1d l11~lrkt'ting 
utT-label lIses l)C LU\ellox. \\ l1i\..'h in tLirn caU:;\,l! healthcare prO\iders tll pn:-;'-'llt 
t:,llse claims [, l the go\ernmcnt. Accepting relators theon of li~lbility. the l" 'urt 
fuul1d that tll'-'y had dr[!\\l1 a rcasunablc inferenec that cLtims for rl'il11bursCIli\..'l1t 
rt'garding oll .. Ltbt'l lIS\..':) \\t.'1'e submitted to the tt'deral gO\t'rnl1lt'tll (md denit'd 
lh:~relldant's n](ltilll1 to dismiss, 
technical ,mel J nadvertcnt Ad l11i nistrat i vc V io laJiolls: 1'0 sLlcc('cd on a FC A ,: I ai m. a 
(/Ili (UIlI relator or the go\ernment IllLlst demonstrate that an alkged claim or 
statement is ElIse or fmudulellt. In making this determinatioll IllnSI courts requiring a 
sho\ving of "nw:l'riality:" that is. evidence that (I) the alleged 1~11se stakment nr claim 
was cssential to the government's funding decisiun; (.2) tile go\crIll1lellt Sll\;l..'ilically 
rt'iied on the falsity: and (J) the t~dsity caused the guvenunent to pa) (Jut SlllllS it 
olher'vvise would not have paid, Despite this strict and unambiguolls requirement. the 
Department of ,Justice has sought FCA liability for technical and immaterial 
noncompliance 'v'vith administrative regUlations, 
o In ['lIired ,')'rule.l ex rei. Co II l/Cl' 1', Salillo Regio/1u/ ITea/rh Cellrer, IlIc .. 5·n F,Jd 
1211 (10th eiL 200S). the Tenth Circuit recently rejected an FCA claim in which 
a rclator alleged that a health center failed to comply with a 'varidy of Medicare 
n:'gulations, including quality of 1..'<11'e standards, but nevertheless certified 
compliance 'v'vith the laws and regulations regarding the provision oj' health care 
services in its alUlUal cost reports. The court noted that the certification at issue 
"contains only general s\veeping language and docs not contain language stating 
that payment is conditioned on perfect compliance with <lny particular law or 
regulation." The Tenth Circuit also distinguished bel\veen conditions of program 
participation and conditions of payment in rejecting the "broader theory that a 
CllSt report certitieation could c'\pressly condition all :vfcdic~lre payments on 
compliance with a full host of teclmieal Medicare requirements, including quality 
of care standards," 
• The False Claims Correction Act of 2007 (s, ::041): Scnatelr Charles Grasslcy (R-IA) 
recently introduced a bill that. if adopted. wmlld increase Ie viabilitv nf nlllllenll\ 
\vhistleblower claims: 
o Proposed l'l'visiul1s in many cases \\ould pert1lit tt'der~Il eillployees to bring (/ui 
1(/111 actions and largely eliminate the FCA's "original source" requirt~ll1ellts: 
o "Rctcntiull of o\'erp~lyrnents" - the retention ur' a known Llverp~lyl11l'l1t could sent: 
as tlte basis for an FCA suit: 
o The FCA would no longer require a Elise claim to be presented to an officer or 
empluyee of the governmcnt. provided the llloney or property arc spent on thl' 
gO\tTnl11enl's bdwlC 
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• \lagnitude of Reel'llt Settlements: llwugh not binding upon nOllparties. settlement 
agreements are increasingly relied UPl)11 by the Departmcllt of Justice as a source of 
lewrage in nut-of.-court negotiations. in eftect creating a slwdow-body of common /<1\\. 
Ih: Lllitcd SWks secured $1.3-1- billion in sl'ttlements and judgments in the fiscal year 
ending Sept. 30. 2008. plIl'suing alkgati'll1s of fraud against the fedcral go\cl'llmcnt. This 
brings total reeo\eries since 1l)~6. \\ hen Congress substantially strengthened the FCA. to 
more than S21 billion. Although just ullderv,ay. 200L) recoveries already exceed thuse of 
2008. 
o On JC\J1uary 26. 2()()9. Pfizer. Inc. disclosed that it agreed to pay apPlw,imately 
$2.3 billion to settle a federal inwstigation into its alleged off-label marketing of 
l-kxtra. a prescription pain killer. If approved by the court. the settlemcnt would 
mark largest t'ntered into by a health care company. dwarting Eli Lily's recent 
settlement Cor similar allegations. 
o 011 January 15. 2009, Eli Lilly and Cumpany agreed to plead guilty and pay 
$1.415 billion for promoting its drug Zyprexa fur lIses not approwd by the FDA. 
This resolution included a criminal fine of $515 million. the Imgest criminal fine 
to elate levied against an individual corporation in a United States. Eli Lilly will 
also pay up to $800 million in a chil settlemcnt ,\'ith the federal government and 
the states. 
o On November 25.2008. Bayer HealthCare LLC (Bayer) agreed to pay the United 
States $97.5 million plus interest to sl'ttle ~dlcgatiuns that it paid kickbacks to a 
number of diabetic suppliers and caused those suppliers tu submit false claims to 
Medicare. The settlement'resolves allegations that Bayer engaged in a cash-felr-
patient scheme through which the company paid 11 diabetic suppliers to convert 
their patients to Bayer's products from supplies manufactured by its competitors. 
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